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Abstract
We investigate experimentally the economic effects of wage taxation to ﬁnance unemployment
beneﬁts for a closed economy and an international economy. The main ﬁndings are the following.
(i) There is clear evidence of a vicious circle in the dynamic interaction between the wage tax
and unemployment. (ii) Employment is boosted by budget deﬁcits but subsequent tax rate
adjustments to balance the budget lead to employment levels substantially lower than theoretically
predicted. (iii) A sales risk for producers due to price uncertainty on output markets appears to cause
a downward pressure on factor employment. For labor the wage tax exacerbates this adverse effect.
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For more than two decades now unemployment has ﬁgured prominently on the political
and economic agenda of many industrialized countries. Although a great number of
theoretical and empirical studies exists and many proposals have been made, there is no
consensus yet on how to solve the unemployment puzzle (Oswald, 1997).
1
Welfare state arrangements and the accompanying tax burdens are generally considered
as an important factor fostering unemployment. Using European economies as an
example, Snower (2000) points out that these arrangements were established under
economic fair-weather conditions. Once the weather started to deteriorate they more and
more resembled quicksand. Rising unemployment led to higher social transfers, producing
higher taxes on a shrinking tax base, which in turn negatively affected employment: ‘‘And
so the cycle continues’’ (Snower, 2000, p. 44).
Indeed, quite a few studies point at a positive feedback effect of general taxes and labor
taxation (the tax-wedge) on unemployment. Good examples for this group of studies are
Tullio (1987) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). The former author presents an analysis of
long-run consequences of tax and public debt increases in Europe and concludes that ‘‘tax-
ﬁnanced growth in government expenditure ð...Þ has caused unemployment’’ (Tullio, 1987,
p. 769). In a similar vein, the latter authors provide empirical evidence that in Europe high
labor costs are a main cause for high unemployment rates and that these high labor costs
are mainly due to high taxes on labor.
Whereas the mentioned studies clearly suggest the possibility of a vicious circle others
contest its signiﬁcance as a cause of unemployment. According to Oswald (1997):
‘‘Contrary to conventional wisdom, high unemployment does not appear to be primarily
the result of overly generous beneﬁts, trade union power, taxes, or wage inﬂexibility’’
(p. 14); and, more speciﬁcally: ‘‘Payroll taxes alone are uncorrelated with the pattern of
unemployment across nations’’ (p. 8). Consistent with this view, OECD (1990, Annex 6.A)
does not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant long-run inﬂuence of the total tax wedge on labor costs and by
implication on employment. Similarly, Gruber (1997) reports that a pay-roll tax reduction
of 25 percentage points, which took place in Chile in the early eighties of the last century,
had only negligible effects on employment.
Thus, notwithstanding a great number of empirical investigations,
2 the literature
seems still undecided regarding the actual vicious nature of labor taxation. Con-
sequently, Nickell and Layard (1999), summarize very cautiously that ‘‘the balance of the
evidence suggests that there is probably some overall adverse tax effect on unemployment
and labor input.’’ (Nickell and Layard, 1999, p. 3060; emphasis added). This may not be
surprising in view of the many difﬁculties researchers face in the ﬁeld concerning the
adequate speciﬁcation of an econometric model dealing with the complexity of full-scale
economies and the serious lack of data (see e.g. Nickell and Layard, 1999; Nickell et al.,
2005).
From this perspective, it seems worthwhile to make use of a relatively novel,
complementary approach: Laboratory experimentation, which is also empirical but allows
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1See also Economic Policy (1997, p. 217) and Nickell et al. (2005).
2For further evidence see, e.g. Elmeskov et al. (1998), European Commission (1994), Nickell and Layard (1997),
Pissarides (1998), Sørenson (1997). For a relatively early theoretical study showing the possibility of a ‘‘crowding-
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nexus between labor taxation and unemployment.
3 Through the investigation of relatively
simple economies—which are nevertheless real in the basic sense that real people make real
choices with real consequences—additional and less noisy information may be obtained
about this nexus and the behavioral adjustment processes that the vicious circle argument
refers to. Of course, the abstraction exploited by this research method implies a trade-off
with external validity that cannot be completely avoided.
4 However, note that theoretical
models in fact face a similar problem. Furthermore, as we will show below, our
experimental design and the results obtained capture features that are also observed in
naturally occurring economies.
In our view, a particularly important contribution of laboratory experiments to
macroeconomics can be that it may shed a new light on the question of the
microfoundation of macroeconomics. Especially, behavioral aspects like the signiﬁcance
of norms or cognitive features such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting and bounded
rationality in expectation formation can be fruitfully investigated with the help of
laboratory experimentation (see e.g. Akerlof, 2002; Adam, 2005). Furthermore, it can
generate interesting new empirical as well as theoretical research questions. This we also
hope to show with our study.
This study is based on a research project regarding the economic performance of tax
systems commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, following
a motion carried by the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament.
5 To the best of our
knowledge, it is for the ﬁrst time that policymakers explicitly asked for laboratory
experiments to support macro-economic policymaking. Our paper ﬁts into a still relatively
small but growing stream of ‘design’ studies, as Alvin Roth labels them in his Fisher
Schultz Lecture (Roth, 2002). From a broader perspective, our study is part of an emerging
research ﬁeld showing the usefulness of macro-economic experiments as a complementary
research tool next to the more traditional methods of theoretical and ﬁeld empirical
analysis.
6
More speciﬁcally, we experimentally investigate the economic performance of economies
operating under a wage tax ﬁnanced unemployment beneﬁt system, as it is common in
many developed countries. Two different economic environments are investigated: A
closed economy, and an international economy with a relatively small ‘home country’ and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
3Natural experiments that allow for good control in outside-lab environments are rare events. An example is the
case where Washington State was forced to adopt a new tax system in 1985. Anderson and Meyer (2000) use this
case to investigate the tax incidence of a payroll tax.
4For a recent more general discussion of the problem of external validity of results gathered through laboratory
experimentation, see Schram (2005). From the user perspective, it seems noteworthy that there is an increasing
demand for policy oriented experiments (many of which concerning markets), which provides some ﬁeld evidence
of the perceived usefulness of this empirical research method, also for studying more complicated economic
settings (see e.g. Roth, 2002; Normann and Riccuiti, 2004).
5The project was assisted by a steering committee consisting of internationally reputed scientists with expertise
in public economics, labor economics, game theory, experimental economics and applied general equilibrium
modeling. For more details the interested reader is referred to van Winden et al. (1999).
6On experiments concerning taxation issues, see Davis and Swenson (1993), Quirmbach et al. (1996). For other
macro-economic experiments, see Bosch-Dome ` nech and Silvestre (1997), Goeree and Holt (1999), Hey and di
Cagno (1998), Lian and Plott (1998), Noussair et al. (1995, 1997, 2003), Adam (2005).
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simultaneously. In both cases there are input markets for capital and labor, and output
markets for the goods produced by two production sectors. In the open economies
environment, there are international markets for capital and one commodity. In each
environment two tax regimes are imposed in sequence. During the ﬁrst part of each
experimental session the wage tax rate is held constant. This allows us to investigate
whether the economies stabilize and, if so, at what level of the different economic variables.
To analyze the dynamic interaction between the wage tax and unemployment as well as
other indicators of economic performance, in the second part of each session, the tax rate is
adjusted to the previous period’s deﬁcit in the budget of the tax–beneﬁt system.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in investigating whether wage tax ﬁnanced
unemployment beneﬁts may produce a vicious circle boosting unemployment and
deteriorating the performance of an economy as a whole. We therefore abstract in this
ﬁrst approach from other factors conducive to unemployment, like efﬁciency wages or
institutions fostering insider–outsider effects. Furthermore, we will not distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary unemployment because, for the empirical questions at hand,
this distinction is ‘‘fruitless’’ (Layard et al., 1991, p. 91).
7 Moreover, from a budgetary
point of view it does not really matter much whether in the end the beneﬁts have to be paid
for voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed units of labor.
To facilitate equilibration and efﬁciency we implement competitive double auctions for
all markets. This trading mechanism has been shown to be very effective in fostering trade
and equilibration in experimental markets (see e.g. Davis and Holt, 1993). In this way, we
give the theory of competitive markets, that we will use as benchmark, its best chance to
perform well. Moreover, ﬁnding a vicious circle in such a competitive environment would
only strengthen the signiﬁcance of the result.
8
Our main ﬁndings are the following: First, for all economies we ﬁnd clear evidence of a
vicious circle in the dynamic interaction between the wage tax and unemployment. Second,
employment seems to be boosted by deﬁcits in the budget of the tax–beneﬁt system.
However, subsequent tax rate adjustments in order to balance the budget, as typically
required by the wage tax ﬁnanced unemployment beneﬁt system, lead to employment levels
that substantially fall short of the predictions obtained from the general equilibrium
benchmark model. Third, and related to the previous point, there appears to be a
downward pressure on the employment of production factors caused by a (disequilibrium)
sales risk for producers. Due to uncertainty about output prices, and hence revenues,
producers are reluctant to employ inputs. For labor this downward pressure on
employment is exacerbated by the wage tax. Our results provide support for the
hypothesis of a ‘risk-compensated price mechanism’ where the reluctance of producers to
employ inputs is accompanied by (in comparison with the equilibrium predictions) too low
input prices and too high output prices. This mechanism is not accounted for in general
equilibrium models. Reliance on such models in policymaking would, therefore, lead to
unexpected unemployment and disappointing economic performance. This may also help
ARTICLE IN PRESS
7Rogerson (1997) convincingly argues that any distinction between voluntary and involuntary, frictional and
cyclical, equilibrium and disequilibrium unemployment is meaningless because all unemployment consists of all
these components.
8According to Snower (1994, p. 65), unemployment beneﬁt systems typically augment common labor market
failures, particularly those highlighted by efﬁciency wage, insider–outsider, and union theories.
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and unemployment.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents
the experimental design and theoretical predictions. Results are given and discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental design and theoretical predictions
2.1. Experimental environment
We consider two types of economies, a closed economy and an international economy. The
latter involves two ‘countries’, a relatively small ‘home country’ ðhÞ and a relatively large
‘foreign country’ ðfÞ. In both economies there are consumers and producers participating in
computerized multiple unit double auction markets (see Plott and Gray, 1990). Each
consumer i is endowed with ¯ Ki units of capital and ¯ Li units of labor that can be sold to
producers j, as inputs on a capital and a labor market. Consumers derive utility (money
earnings in the experiment) from ‘leisure’, the unsold units of labor ¯ Li   Li,a n dt h e
consumption of two commodities, Xi and Yi. In addition to their proceeds from sales, they
obtain an unemployment beneﬁt for each unsold unit of labor that can be used for the
purchase of consumption goods on the output markets. Goods X and Y are produced in two
separate sectors. The producers in these sectors need capital and labor as inputs, which are
transformed to outputs via given production technologies. The technologies for the two goods
differ in the sense that the production of good X is relatively capital-intensive whereas the
production of good Y is relatively labor-intensive. Producers derive experimental earnings
from proﬁts, determined by the difference between their proceeds from sales in their respective
output market and the costs of inputs. The cost of labor includes a proportional wage tax.
In total, there are four markets in the closed economy: Two factor markets (for K and L)
and two output markets (for X and Y). In the international economy, both the capital
market and the market for X are ‘international’ (‘exposed’), whereas the markets for labor
and commodity Y are ‘local’ (‘sheltered’). Consequently, the total number of markets in
this economy equals six. To implement a large foreign economy in the lab—making the
home country similar to a ‘small’ open economy—we choose the following design.
While keeping the number of consumers and producers the same for both countries in
the international economy, we endow the consumers in the foreign country with seven
times as many units of labor and capital as the consumers in the home country. Moreover,
a scaling factor in the production functions of foreign producers is adjusted such that
theoretically supply and demand in the foreign economy are seven times as high as in the
home economy. Table 1 shows the parameters of the experimental economies, including
continuous approximations of the earnings functions (utility and proﬁt functions) of
consumers and producers, and the production technology of producers.
9
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9In addition to the endowment of capital and labor for consumers both consumers and producers are endowed
with some cash to facilitate trading. Note, also, that with the requirement of at least three agents on each side of a
market (as e.g. in Quirmbach et al., 1996), which seems to be the smallest number of agents ensuring that the
markets approximate competitiveness (see also Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 150), the minimal number of subjects
would have been 64, in case of the alternative approach of increasing numbers of agents instead of endowments.
Apart from potential control problems with that many subjects, lab size restrictions urged us to choose the design
of this study.




Preferences (in each period t):
Consumers: Uit ¼ 25½lnXit þ lnYit þ 0:25lnð¯ Li   LitÞ 
Uit ¼ 0 if either Xit, Yit,o r¯ L   Lit equals zero
Producers: Pjt ¼ pztZjt  ð 1 þ ttÞwtLjt   rtKjt; Z ¼ X;Y
In international economy: pyt, Yjt, tt, wt, and Ljt are determined ‘locally’
(within a country)
pxt, Xjt, rt, Kjt are determined ‘internationally’
(one international market)
Parameters (in each period t):
Endowments (per economic agent) and francs/Dutch cents conversion rates
Closed economy International economy
Home country Foreign country
Consumers ¯ Li ¼ 60; ¯ Ki ¼ 40; ¯ Li ¼ 15; ¯ Ki ¼ 10 ¯ Li ¼ 105; ¯ Ki ¼ 70
Cashi ¼ 725 Cashi ¼ 181 Cashi ¼ 1268
Conversion ratei ¼ 1:2 Conversion ratei ¼ 3:6 Conversion ratei ¼ 1:8
X producers ¯ Lj ¼ 0; ¯ Kj ¼ 0; ¯ Lj ¼ 0; ¯ K ¼ 0 ¯ Lj ¼ 0; ¯ Kj ¼ 0
Cashj ¼ 4890 Cashj ¼ 1223 Cashj ¼ 8557
Conversion ratej ¼ 0:4 Conversion ratej ¼ 2:8 Conversion ratej ¼ 0:4
Y producers ¯ Lj ¼ 0; ¯ Kj ¼ 0; ¯ Lj ¼ 0; ¯ Kj ¼ 0 ¯ Lj ¼ 0; ¯ Kj ¼ 0
Cashj ¼ 3260 Cashj ¼ 815 Cashj ¼ 5705
Conversion ratej ¼ 0:6 Conversion ratej ¼ 4:2 Conversion ratej ¼ 0:6
Number of
agents:
Consumers 6 3 3
X producers 4 2 2
Y producers 6 3 3
Production (in each period t):
Production
function:
Zjt ¼ A½Z1 gz
z L
gz






Labor intensity: Zx ¼ 0:5625; Zy ¼ 0:6750
Substitution elasticity: gx ¼  2; gy ¼  6
Scaling factor A:1 :15 in closed economy
1 for home country in international economy
1:21 for foreign country in international
economy
‘Government’ (in each period t):
Unemployment
beneﬁt: w0 ¼ 70
Wage tax
rate:




¯ L   Lt
Lt
in ‘variable tax periods’ (¯ L ¼
P
i ¯ Li; Lt ¼
P
jLjt)
with an upper bound of 0:9 
aIn the table subscript i ðjÞ is used for consumers (producers); missing time subscripts t indicate that the variable
or parameter is constant over time.  This upper limit was set given the experience with another tax system
investigated in van Winden et al. (1999). Pilot studies showed that tax rates too close or even above 100% might
have a strong discouraging effect on trading.
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utility function. We used a Cobb–Douglas-type because it guarantees an interior optimum
and—together with other assumptions—the existence of a general equilibrium. The use of
a log-linearized version has the advantage that it can be presented to the experimental
subjects in a simple way showing only the marginal and total payoff for each of the three
arguments, leisure and consumption goods X and Y. An example of such a table can be
found in Appendix B.1.
Producers production schedules are discrete approximations of the CES production
functions shown in the lower part of Table 1. The functions exhibit slightly decreasing
returns to scale allowing producers to make strictly positive proﬁts in the theoretical
equilibrium. Furthermore, the implemented factor intensities and elasticities of substitu-
tion differ in the two sectors and resemble estimates for the Dutch economy. To the
subjects production schedules are presented in the form of tables. An example of such a
table can be found in Appendix B.2.
Fig. 1(a) presents a ﬂow diagram of all goods for the more complex international
economy. A ﬂow diagram of the closed economy can be generated by deleting all symbols
and arrows referring to the foreign country, for instance. Rectangles represent economic
agents (consumers and producers) while oval forms represent markets where these agents
can buy and sell factors and commodities. The arrows depict the ﬂow of these goods. For
instance, ‘consumers in home country’ (upper left rectangle) can sell their labor
endowments on the local ‘labor market in home country’ and their capital endowments
on the ‘international capital market’ on which also ‘consumers in foreign country’ (lower
left rectangle) are active. On the ‘international capital market’ and the local labor markets
producers can buy the respective factors from consumers active on these markets. The ﬂow
of commodities from producers to consumers via the markets for Y and X works in an
equivalent way.
We took care to make the closed economy similar to the international economy. In
particular, the closed economy should also be ‘large’. In the closed economy, the total
number of consumers and producers is the same as in the international economy.
Consumers are endowed with four times as many units of capital and labor as consumers
in the home country of the international economy. The scaling factor in the production
function of producers is adjusted such that theoretically supply and demand will be four
times as large as in the home country of the international economy.
In both economies ‘francs’ are used as the experimental currency unit, implying that
only one currency exists in the open economies.
10 The rates at which earnings in francs
were converted into Dutch guilders (conversion rate) can be found in Table 1. This table
(bottom) also shows the two ways in which the wage tax is implemented. During the ﬁrst
seven (closed economy) or eight (international economy) trading periods into which the
experimental sessions are divided (see below) the tax rate is kept constant, while it adjusts
to the previous period’s budget deﬁcit (that is, outlays on unemployment beneﬁts minus
ARTICLE IN PRESS
10Since we are not focusing on issues of international ﬁnance, we do not want to complicate the experiments by
introducing multiple currencies. Generally, the use of an artiﬁcial experimental currency is common practice in
experimental market economies (see, e.g. Noussair et al., 1995; Quirmbach et al., 1996). In our experiment the use
of such a currency has the advantage that it allows us to equalize the expected earnings of subjects in different
roles, based on the theoretical model.
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Firstly, we need a sufﬁcient number of repetitions in a constant environment with exactly
the same conditions in each period to see if economic behavior stabilizes and at what
level.
11 Secondly, we want to analyze the dynamic interaction between the wage tax and
indicators of economic performance, if the wage tax adjusts to deﬁcits (surpluses), while
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 1. Flow diagram of the international economy (a) and sequence of events (b).
11In less complex experimental competitive environments behavior usually stabilizes—in the neighborhood of
the theoretical predictions—within the ﬁrst few periods (Davis and Holt, 1993).
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intertemporal budget constraint forcing it to balance the budget across all periods. Our
main goal is to examine how the markets react to the introduction of some ﬁscal discipline,
while keeping all other parameters the same.
2.2. Procedures
In total seven experimental sessions were conducted: Four concerning the closed
economy, and three involving the international economy. Table 2 provides some
data characterizing these sessions. All experiments were run at the CREED-laboratory
of the University of Amsterdam. Subjects, undergraduates at the University and
mostly coming from its Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, participated in three
meetings. At the ﬁrst meeting they got thoroughly acquainted with the trading rules,
forms, tables, and the software of the double auction markets. Producers and con-
sumers were separately trained.
12 Then, at the second meeting, subjects participated,
in their respective role, in the closed economy experiment. Again after a few days,
this was followed by the third meeting concerning the international economy experi-
ment. Each meeting lasted about 3.5h. Because of the complexity of the inter-
national economy (with one of the novel aspects being the many units to be traded by
subjects in the foreign economy), it was decided to use only experienced subjects for this
experimental environment. The closed economy experiment, with its intermediately sized





Summary of experimental sessions
Date Economy Number of Experience Number of Number of
subjects periods
a constant tax periods
05=10=98 Closed 16 Training 14 ð3Þ 7
05=10=98 Closed 16 Training 13 ð3Þ 7
06=10=98 Closed 16 Training 12 ð3Þ 7
06=10=98 Closed 16 Training 14 ð3Þ 7
08=10=98 International 16 Closed economy 16 ð2Þ 8
08=10=98 International 16 Closed economy 16 ð2Þ 8
09=10=98 International 16 Closed economy 16 ð2Þ 8
aNumber of practice periods in parentheses.
12To avoid experimenter-induced effects, the bids and asks of the experimenters who acted as counterparts in
the markets for training were randomly varied within a considerable range, which was the same for all training
sessions.
13Furthermore, subjects were selected for the international economy experiment on the basis of their
performance (earnings) in the closed economy experiment. All subjects got informed about this during the ﬁrst
meeting. Subjects received a show-up fee of 70 guilders (31.80 euro) for the training. They got a show-up fee of 40
guilders (18.20 euro) and earned on average 27 guilders (12.25 euro) in the closed economy session. For the
international economy session these ﬁgures were, respectively, 10 and 67 guilders (4.55 and 30.45 euro). All money
was paid out privately at the end of the third meeting.
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general part which was read aloud and a speciﬁc part to be read by themselves. The speciﬁc
part only presented instructions that were relevant to the subject in its speciﬁc role of
consumer or producer. Apart from similar information provided on the computer screen,
subjects received personal history forms containing all the information that was relevant to
the subject (endowments, markets they were allowed to trade in, any taxes or subsidies,
and the conversion rate of francs into guilders).
14 By having them ﬁll in their purchases,
sales, and earnings these forms were also intended to make subjects fully aware of the
consequences of their actions. Quizzes were used to check the understanding of
the procedures, the reading of the redemption values and production schedules, and the
calculation of earnings.
15
Each experiment consisted of a number of trading periods, with a couple of practice
periods at the beginning in which no money was earned. Except for the adjustment of the
wage tax in later periods, all periods were identical in terms of endowments and parameter
values. Apart from subjects’ earnings, nothing carried over from one period to the
next. Each period was divided into two phases. In the ﬁrst phase the factor markets for
capital and labor were open, while in the second phase the product markets were open.
Including some recording time and time to look up information, each phase took about
5min. Fig. 1(b) depicts the sequence of events.
Standing bids and asks in the labor market were presented as ‘market prices’ (exclusive
of the wage tax) and as ‘inclusive prices’ (including the tax), where for consumers
the former and for producers the latter was highlighted on the computer screen. After the
closing of the factor markets consumers were informed about the unemployment beneﬁts
received due to unsold labor units, while producers were informed about the number of
goods produced with the inputs they bought. In addition, some market statistics were
provided concerning the amounts of capital and labor traded, average prices, and the
average price subjects received (paid) for the inputs they sold (bought). After the closing of
the product markets similar market statistics were provided on the computer screen.
2.3. Theoretical predictions
The theoretical benchmark is based on a general equilibrium model. In our view, such a
model describes our experimental economies, exhibiting several interdependent markets
and the highly competitive double auction trading mechanism, in a most suitable way. The
excess demand functions are derived under the assumption of utility and proﬁt maximizing
behavior using the functional forms and parameter values shown in Table 1.
In the investigated economies a general equilibrium requires that the excess demands on
all markets are zero and additionally, that wage tax rates are set such that the budget of the
tax–beneﬁt system is balanced. The complexity of the economies makes it impossible to
ﬁnd analytical solutions. We, therefore, calculated the general equilibrium numerically.
Similar benchmark modeling is used in other studies of complex experimental markets (e.g.
Noussair et al., 1995, 1997, 2003; Quirmbach et al., 1996).
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14In the experiment consumers were labeled ‘type-I traders’ and producers ‘type-II traders’. Labor and capital
were denoted as good V and good W, respectively. Markets were labeled as V1(2), W1, X1, and Y1(2); the
unemployment beneﬁt was denoted as a subsidy for unsold units of V.
15A sample copy of all material used in the experiments is available upon request from the authors.
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production (which equals consumption in equilibrium), relative prices, and the
‘government’ variables wage tax and budget balance. The second column shows the
predictions for the closed economy and the third and ﬁfth column depicts the results for
the home and foreign country, respectively, in the international economy. The fourth
column shows overall equilibrium quantities of good X and factor K that are traded
internationally and the relative prices of these goods on the international markets. Due to
our parameter choices, the overall equilibrium quantities, the unemployment rate, and the
equilibrium wage tax in the international economy match those in the closed economy.
Furthermore, the home and the foreign country in the international economy are perfectly
symmetric except for their size. These equilibrium features facilitate a comparison of actual
behavior across economies.
3. Empirical analysis
In this section we present our main experimental results and observations. We ﬁrst
concentrate on the functioning of the economies in a more general way and their
performance relative to the theoretical benchmark predictions under the constant tax




Variable Closed economy International economy
Home country Foreign country
Production:
X 177 22 177 155
Y 151 19 132
Factor employment:
K 240 30 240 210
L 226 28 197
Unemployment rate




py 0.3628 0.2211 0.2211
r 0.0504 0.0307
w 0.2780 0.1694 0.1694
‘Government’:
Budget balance 0 0 0
Wage tax rate 0.3777 0.3777 0.3777
aFor convenience, the unemployment rate is calculated with respect to total initial endowment of labor units,
i.e. the potential labor force.
bRelative prices are deﬁned by dividing nominal prices with the sum of all nominal prices. The relative prices in
the international economy differ from those in the closed economy, since there are two local markets for labor and
the labor intensive product Y, respectively. Treating each of them as just one market would give the same relative
prices in the closed economy and the international economy.
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will also look at the impact of budget deﬁcits on employment. Finally, we present and
provide evidence for a behavioral explanation of the observed divergence between the
empirical results and the theoretical predictions.
3.1. General performance of the economies
The ﬁrst result concerns the functioning of the experimental economies.
Result 1. The development of prices in both the closed and the international economy shows a
clear structure, with generally most variation during the initial periods. Furthermore, both the
ratio of employed inputs and the ratio of outputs are inversely related to the respective price
ratio, in line with the theoretical prediction.
Support: Focusing ﬁrst on the initial periods with a constant tax rate we ﬁnd
that the average standard deviation of transaction prices in the ﬁrst two periods is larger
than in the last two periods of the constant tax regime. This holds for the closed as
well as the international economy and for all markets, except one. In the later
periods, when the tax rate adjusts to the previous period budget deﬁcit this property
cannot be conﬁrmed for all markets. We attribute this to the changing tax rates in this
tax regime, which induce larger price variations and thus uncertainty into the eco-
nomies (see Observation 4). Regarding the input markets generally a (mostly signiﬁcant)
positive relationship between the capital–labor employment ratio and the inverse input
price ratio is observed. A similar picture concerning the relationship between the X–Y
consumption ratio and the inverse of the output price ratio is obtained for the output
markets.
16
Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate the development of the quantities and prices over the periods. The
straight horizontal lines indicate the theoretical predictions. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of
sales of inputs and outputs (averaged across sessions). Perhaps the most striking result is
the decrease in economic activity once the tax rates start to adjust to the previous period
budget deﬁcit or surplus, which happens in period 8 in the closed economy and in period 9
in the international economy. We will come back to this below. Here we will mainly focus
on the constant tax periods. Notice, that with only one exception (labor employment Lh in
the home country of the international economy) all quantities start too low in comparison
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16We tested these relationships by using cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions (allowing for
heteroscedasticity between panels and AR(1) within panels; we also allowed for different intercepts per session
by using session dummies.). The units of observation for the input market regressions are the ratio of employed
capital and employed labor (as dependent variable) and the ratio of the average nominal inclusive wage and the
average nominal capital price (as independent variable), per session and period. For the output market
regressions, the dependent variable is the ratio of X-consumption and Y-consumption, and the independent
variable the ratio of the average nominal price of Y and the average nominal price of X. With respect to the input
markets the coefﬁcient of the price ratio shows the ‘right’ positive sign for all sectors, except the Y-sector in the
home country where it is insigniﬁcantly negative. For the X-sectors in the closed economy and the foreign country
in the international economy, as well as sector Y in the foreign country the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly positive at
least at the 5% level. For the X-sector in the home country and the Y-sector in the closed economy the coefﬁcient
of the price ratio is positive but not signiﬁcant. With respect to the output markets we ﬁnd, for both countries in
the international economy, the expected positive coefﬁcient for the price ratio, which is signiﬁcant at the 10% level
in both cases. For the closed economy the coefﬁcient is negative but not signiﬁcant.
A. Riedl, F. van Winden / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 871–900 882with the theoretical levels. However, in many cases there also seems to be some
convergence to the theoretical predictions.
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of relative prices. The ﬁgure indicates that, with the
exception of pyf (the price of good Y in the foreign country), all output prices start
at a higher level than predicted. Concerning the input prices it shows that wages in the
closed economy and in the foreign country of the international economy are clearly too
low, whereas the wage rate in the home country is too high. Interestingly, in the
international economy, the capital price is far too low without showing any tendency to
increase, whereas the capital price in the closed economy starts too high but steadily
decreases over time. Note, that the relatively high capital price in the closed economy is
accompanied by too little capital employment. As the capital price decreases employment
of capital slowly converges to the full employment level (see Figs. 2(a) and 3(a)). In the
international economy, with its low capital price over all periods, capital employment








































































































Fig. 2. Development of transacted quantities over periods (averages across sessions): (a) closed economy;
(b) international economy.
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We will now investigate more thoroughly whether the economic process indeed
shows a tendency to converge towards the equilibrium predictions during the constant tax
periods. To this end we have performed a statistical convergence analysis for the periods
with constant tax rates, based on the following estimation model (see Noussair et al.,
1995):
yit ¼ B11D1ð1=tÞþB12D2ð1=tÞþ   þB1iDið1=tÞþ   þB1nDnð1=tÞþB2ðt   1Þ=t þ u,
where y stands for the particular outcome (price or quantity) focused upon, i denotes
the experimental session, t the trading period in the session, Di a dummy variable
which is equal to 1 for i and 0 otherwise, B1i the session speciﬁc starting value of a
possible convergence process, and u the error term. Note that B2 is the asymptote of y.








































































Fig. 3. Development of relative prices over periods (averages across sessions): (a) closed economy;
(b) international economy.
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common asymptote ðB2Þ.
In assessing whether the variable in question converges to the predicted value we are
using two deﬁnitions of convergence: ‘Strong convergence’ and ‘weak convergence’ (as in
Noussair et al., 1995; Lian and Plott, 1998). A variable is said to ‘strongly converges’ to the
predicted value if B2 is statistically not signiﬁcantly different from that value.
The second deﬁnition of convergence is less demanding. The term ‘weak convergence’ is
used when a strict majority of the starting values of the data, as measured by B1i, is further
from the model’s prediction than the asymptote, as measured by B2. This deﬁnition is
clearly weaker than ‘strong convergence’ but still captures some movement towards the
equilibrium prediction.
17 The following result summarizes the ﬁndings of this convergence
analysis.
Result 2 (Constant tax regime—convergence). (i) Only a few variables strongly converge to
the predicted values. Thus, from a statistical point of view the theoretical benchmark model
has to be rejected.
(ii) For the closed economy weak convergence towards the theoretical predictions occurs for
three of the nine variables. For the international economy weak convergence is found for eight
out of 14 variables.
Support: To save on space we report here only the general ﬁndings (the detailed results of
the regression analysis can be found in Appendix A (Table A1)). (i) Only one of the nine
asymptotic values of the price and quantity variables concerning the closed economy is not
signiﬁcantly different from the values predicted by the model (at the 5% signiﬁcance level).
Only a slightly better outcome is obtained for the international economy, where three of
the 14 values are not signiﬁcantly different from the equilibrium predictions. (ii) In the
closed economy the quantities of X and L as well as the wage rate w are weakly
converging. In the international economy this is the case for the quantities of Yf, K, Lh,
and Lf, the relative prices r, wh,a n dpyf, as well as the budget surplus in the foreign
country, sf.
On the one hand, the above result indicates that in a strict statistical sense the static
competitive model has to be rejected as an accurate description of behavior in our
experimental markets. This, however, is not too surprising since in a strict statistical sense
the competitive model is often also not conﬁrmed in simpler environments. It is also
consistent with results found in other albeit less complex experimental market economies
(see, e.g., Lian and Plott, 1998). On the other hand, given the complexity of our markets,
the result may be viewed as surprising since it shows that there is clear order in the data
and that this order moves (weakly) towards the competitive prediction. More precisely, in
the sense of weak convergence, the above result gives some support for the theoretical
model. It is interesting, that despite its larger complexity the international economy
performs better than the closed economy, relative to the theoretical benchmark
predictions. We attribute this to the stronger monetary incentives and greater experience
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17Note, that ‘divergence’ would imply that the asymptote is further away from the predicted value (or at least
not closer) than most of the initial values. Similarly, if the movement of variables would be completely random
(without drift) one would expect that all initial values are similar to the asymptotic value. For this reason, ‘weak
convergence’ requires that a strict majority of initial values is further from the model’s prediction than the
asymptotic value.
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on in Section 3.3, concerns the direction of the deviation of the asymptotic values from the
theoretically predicted values.
Observation 1 (Constant tax regime—direction of convergence). For all input as well as
output variables it holds that the asymptotic value is smaller than the predicted value. Except
for r in the closed economy and wh in the international economy, this also holds for the
input prices. For the output prices, on the other hand, the reverse holds, with only one
exception ðpyÞ.
Relatively good news for the theoretical benchmark model is obtained by looking at the
total welfare (earnings) of consumers in the experiments in comparison with the predicted
level, denoted as ‘system efﬁciency’.
18 We focus again on the periods with constant tax
rates.
Result 3 (Constant tax regime—system efﬁciency). In both the closed economy and the
international economy system efﬁciency is on average around 95%, and for (almost) all
periods above 90%.
Support: See Appendix A (Table A2).
3.2. Unemployment, taxation, and budget deﬁcits: The vicious circle
In the following, any unemployment that deviates from the theoretical general
equilibrium unemployment rate of 37% might be called ‘disequilibrium unemployment’.
However, in view of the discussion in Rogerson (1997) concerning the usefulness of these
kind of labels for the phenomenon of unemployed labor units, we believe that one should
use it with the necessary restraint. Additionally, here the term equilibrium refers to the
benchmark model that is based on a particular set of behavioral assumptions, which are
not necessarily satisﬁed. We therefore, refrain from using the term ‘disequilibrium
unemployment’.
The above results concerning weak convergence and system efﬁciency throw a not too
negative light on the theoretical benchmark model, at least in a qualitative sense. The ﬁrst
part of next result, which focuses more speciﬁcally on the development of the
unemployment rate under the constant tax regime, corroborates this picture. The second
part of the result, however, shows that this positive result comes at the cost of persistent
budget deﬁcits.
Result 4 (Constant tax regime—labor unemployment and budget deﬁcits). (i) In all
economies the unemployment rate converges at least weakly towards the theoretical
prediction from above.
(ii) All economies show convergence towards a budget deﬁcit. Moreover, in all sessions,
except for one concerning the closed economy, the budget deﬁcits also occur in early periods.
Support: (i) The result follows straightforwardly from the convergence results (see
support of Result 2(ii) and Observation 1). For details we refer the reader to the regression
results for L, Lh, and Lf in Appendix A (Table A1). Fig. 4(a) illustrates the development of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
18The purpose of this measure, which is standard in market experiments, is not to come to unequivocal
conclusions about welfare, but to get an indication of the performance of the theoretical benchmark model.
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time series for the budget surpluses averaged over the experimental sessions,
clearly indicates the presence of budget deﬁcits in all economies. Convergence analysis
corroborates the visual impression. In all economies the asymptotic value of the
relative budget surplus (nominal budget surplus as a fraction of national income) is
signiﬁcantly negative. Furthermore, in the closed economy all but one starting values
are negative, and in the international economy both open economies start with a
budget deﬁcit in all three sessions. For details, see the results for s, sh,a n dsf in Appendix A
(Table A1).
In view of the observed deﬁcits it is naturally to ask how the economies will perform
under some ﬁscal discipline, by having tax rates adjust towards a balanced budget. This is
what we investigate next.
3.2.1. Variable tax regime
In this tax regime the wage tax rate adjusts to the previous period’s budget deﬁcit (or
surplus) of the tax–beneﬁt system, such that, ceteris paribus, the budget would have been
balanced. In the closed economy this happens as of period eight and in the international
economy as of period nine. As the next result shows the introduction of this tax adjustment
process changes the picture rather dramatically.
Result 5 (Variable tax regime—labor unemployment and budget deﬁcits). Once the tax rate
starts to adjust to the budget deﬁcit, in all economies the deﬁcit becomes smaller, while the tax
rate as well as the unemployment rate increases to a level substantially higher than predicted
by the theoretical benchmark model.
Support: See Fig. 4. Recall that the theoretically predicted tax rate is at the constant level
of the initial periods shown in Fig. 4(b). Furthermore, the predicted unemployment rate is
at 37% (see the straight horizontal line in Fig. 4(a)), while the deﬁcit should be zero.
Recall from Fig. 2 that not only labor but all inputs and outputs are adversely affected
by the tax adjustment, in both the closed and international economy. The same holds for
our measure of system efﬁciency (Appendix A, Table A2). To give an impression of the
effects in quantitative terms we focus on two economic measures: The unemployment rate
(measured relative to equilibrium unemployment) and real GNP.
19 We compare for these
variables the asymptotic values of a convergence analysis applied to the constant and
variable tax regime.
20 This analysis shows that the relative unemployment rate increases
from 3.2% to 11.3% in the closed economy, from 5.5% to 10.3% in the home country and
from 3.4% to 15.0% in the foreign country of the international economy. Real GNP
decreases by 5.8% in the closed economy, by 5.4% in the home country and by 18.0% in
the foreign country of the international economy.
In order to investigate the role played by the wage tax more deeply, we will look at the
impact of the unemployment rate in a period on the tax rate in the subsequent period and
on the relation between the tax rate and unemployment rate in the same period. Note in
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19For the calculation of real GNP we use the ﬁrst trading period as base ‘year’; that is, the respective trading
period 1 prices (p1
x and p1
y) are used as weights for the produced quantities of Xt and Yt in period t. Hence, real




yÞ. Similar results are obtained with other periods as base year.
20The regression model for the variable tax regime is the same as for the constant tax regime except that the
trading periods for the former case are redeﬁned such that trading period 8 and 9, respectively, becomes period 1
in the regression.
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between the next period’s tax rate and the previous period’s unemployment rate. If
previous period’s unemployment rate is accompanied by sufﬁciently high before-tax wages
it is possible that a budget surplus is generated. This would imply a decrease in current
period’s tax rate and, hence, a negative correlation between unemployment in t   1 and the




























International economy home country
Closed economy

















































International economy home country (surplus)
International economy foreign country (surplus)
Closed economy (surplus)
International economy home country (tax rate)
International economy foreign country (tax rate)
Closed economy (tax rate)
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Development of unemployment rates (percentage of potential labor force), budget surpluses (fraction of
national income) and wage tax rates: (a) unemployment rates; (b) budget surpluses and wage tax rates.
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signiﬁcantly positively related to the unemployment rate of the previous period.
(ii) The unemployment rate in its turn is signiﬁcantly positively related to the tax rate in the
same period.
Support: (i) Fig. 5(a) clearly shows a positive dependence of the tax rate on the previous
period unemployment rate (up to the imposed maximum rate of 0.9, which is sometimes
obtained as the upper part of the ﬁgure shows). The Spearman rank order correlation
coefﬁcients are high for all economies (rX0:92; po0:001). (ii) Fig. 5(b) illustrates. The
Spearman rank order correlation coefﬁcient clearly shows a positive relationship for all
economies (rX0:67; po0:001).
Together, Results 5 and 6 clearly point at the existence of a vicious circle (Snower’s
cycle), as discussed in the Introduction. In the experimental economies, the budget deﬁcit
developed under a constant tax rate triggers a dynamic adjustment process with increasing
tax rates and unemployment rates that only gradually appears to stabilize at substantially
higher rates for these variables (cf. Result 5). These results are found for both the closed
and the international economy, and in the latter case for both the home and the foreign
country. Finally, it is noticed that the positive relationship between the unemployment rate
and the wage tax rate is consistent with the conclusion that budget deﬁcits have a beneﬁcial
impact on unemployment, as witnessed by the periods with a constant tax rate.
3.3. A behavioral explanation of the unemployment rate
The relatively bad performance of the economies in terms of employment (and other
performance measures, like real GNP) clearly asks for an explanation. In particular, the
role played by the wage tax is of interest in this respect. Given the complexity of the
examined market systems we clearly cannot provide a deﬁnitive answer to this issue, at this
stage. The experimental method, however, gives us the possibility to examine individual
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Fig. 5. The vicious circle between unemployment and wage tax rates.
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important angle for further research.
Our starting point is Observation 1 indicating that during the constant tax periods
inputs and consequently outputs are below the theoretically predicted levels and tend to be
accompanied by lower than predicted input prices and higher than predicted output prices.
It seems that in the economies there is a downward pressure on the employment of
production factors, labor as well as capital. To obtain a further piece of evidence in this
respect, we examined the average per period percentage of producers for which the
marginal revenue product of labor and capital exceeded the respective input price, using
the average current period input and output prices.
21 Accounting for errors, a percentage
of 50% would be in line with (risk-neutral) proﬁt maximizing behavior. The following is
observed, however.
Observation 2. For the closed economy and the home as well as foreign country of the
international economy it holds that, on average, for about 70% of the producers the marginal
revenue product of capital exceeds the input price. For labor this fraction is smaller, though
with approximately 55% still above the 50% level. This is related to the fact that for labor
this fraction shows a temporary drop when the wage tax rate (which is part of the input price)
starts to adjust to the budget deﬁcit, pointing at some inertia in the behavioral adjustment
process.
Support: Table 4 shows the fraction of cases in which producers employed factors such
that the marginal revenue product of the factor exceeded the after tax input price. It
indicates that in all economies and for both production factors this fraction is above 50%.
In all but two cases this difference is also statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the results
are even somewhat stronger for the open economies where subjects (having participated in
the closed economy before) were more experienced. As regards the effect of the tax rate on
this fraction, in particular with respect to labor input, the following is observed. In the
closed economy, for example, the fraction concerning labor temporarily drops from an
average of 54 (61)% over the last three (all) periods of the constant tax regime to 38% in
the ﬁrst two periods of the variable tax regime, in which the tax rate substantially increases.
It gradually increases again thereafter. This explains why—on average—the fraction is
smaller for labor than for capital.
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Table 4
Fraction of producers where marginal revenue product of a production factor exceeds the (after tax) input price
Closed economy International economy
Home country Foreign country Both countries
Labor 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.58
(0.20) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital 0.69 0.72 0.70 0.72
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: based on average current period input and output prices and all periods; within parentheses the probability
of obtaining values as least as extreme as observed when p ¼ 0:5; binomial test, one-sided.
21Similar results are obtained if the average previous period product price is taken for the expected output price.
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reluctance to buy inputs is key for explaining the high unemployment rate. It is important
to note that it is not a lack of labor supply that can account for the higher than predicted
unemployment level. Using the theoretical labor supply function—for each consumer and
trading period—it turns out that a great majority of the consumers actually supplied too
much labor at current period prices.
22
In our view a key factor in the explanation of the downward pressure on input demand
seems to be that in a real economy—like in the lab—producers are facing a risk when
buying inputs, which is not accounted for in a general equilibrium model. This risk is due
to uncertainty about the prices and thus revenues that the goods produced with the inputs
will make in the output markets. The fact that producers are facing this risk, in
combination with risk or ambiguity aversion, can explain the reluctance of producers to
employ ‘enough’ labor and capital, as well as the observed downward pressure on input
prices and upward pressure on output prices (see Observation 1). This view is also
supported by the following observation:
Observation 3. In a majority of markets factor employment is negatively affected by output
price uncertainty (measured by the dispersion of output prices in the previous period). This
effect is particularly pronounced in the open economy with experienced traders.
Support: We have correlated the standard deviations of output transaction prices in
period t   1 in sector X and sector Y per economy and country with the factor
employment in period t in the respective sector. In 8 out of 12 cases the Spearman rank
order correlation coefﬁcient is negative. In ﬁve cases the negative correlations are
statistically signiﬁcant (po0:05, one-sided tests). The non-negative correlation coefﬁcients
are never signiﬁcantly different from zero. More speciﬁcally, in the closed economy none of
the correlations is signiﬁcant (p40:0750; one-sided tests). In the open economy there is a
statistically signiﬁcantly negative correlation in sector X of the small country with respect
to capital and labor (rp   0:30, pp0:0225; one-sided tests). In the large country these
correlations are signiﬁcant in sector X with respect to labor and in sector Y with respect to
capital and labor (rp   0:27, pp0:0353; one-sided tests). In the remaining three markets
the correlation coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcantly different from zero (p40:2855; one-sided
tests).
Interestingly, a similar risk-compensated price mechanism has been observed by Noussair
et al. (1995, 2003) in their experimental investigation of patterns of international trade. It is
important to note that in their study simultaneous input and output markets are
investigated. This suggests that the mechanism is also at work when the sequentiality
between input and output markets is minimized.
23 Furthermore, some theoretical (albeit
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22For the closed as well as the small and large country of the international economy, this happens (averaged
over consumers and periods) in at least 80% of the cases, for both the constant and the variable tax regime. These
results are signiﬁcantly different from 50%, using a binomial test (po0:001, one-sided). We can think of two
factors that may have biased consumer behavior in this direction. First, the relatively small weight (1/9) attached
to leisure in the utility function may have played a role here (see Table 1). Second, the fact that the labor supply
function is steep at the low wage rates (close to the minimum level of the unemployment beneﬁt) that subjects were
confronted with may have led to ‘overshooting’ due to errors.
23Hey and di Cagno (1998), investigating experimentally two sequential double auction markets, also report as
a general ﬁnding that not enough trade took place compared with the competitive equilibrium predictions.
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demand (see Batra and Ullah, 1974; Hartman, 1975, 1976; Holthausen, 1976) and
investment (Saltari and Ticchi, 2005) by risk-averse competitive ﬁrms.
A number of empirical studies support the assumption of risk-averse behavior of
ﬁrms. For instance, Gunjal and Legault (1995) show risk-aversion by ﬁrms and
according to Stiglitz (1999, p. 254): ‘‘There is by now a large body of literature
arguing that normally ﬁrms act in a risk averse manner ð...Þ’’. Zhang (1998, p. 1753)
notes: ‘‘Investors of all types generally exhibit aversion to risk’’. Furthermore, an
interesting study by Brockhaus (1982) suggests that there is no difference with respect to
risk-averse behavior between producers (‘entrepreneurs’ and managers) and the popula-
tion at large (see also Ghosal, 1995).
24 Unfortunately, so far ﬁeld empirical studies
addressing the consequences of risk-averse behavior for input demand appear to be
lacking.
A remaining question is if the wage tax has any effects on output price uncertainty. The
following observation provides an answer.
Observation 4. An increase in the wage tax rate signiﬁcantly increases output
price uncertainty (measured by the dispersion of output prices in the same period), in most
cases.
Support: For the X and the Y sectors in the closed economy and both countries of
the open economy, we have correlated the wage tax rates in a period t with the
standard deviation of nominal output transaction prices in the same period. Since wage
tax rates change only in the variable tax regime observations from this regime are
used in the correlation statistics. In turns out that in all but two of the six cases the
Spearman rank order correlation coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly positive (po0:05, all tests
one-sided). More speciﬁcally, r ¼ 0:57 (p ¼ 0:0019) and r ¼ 0:52 (p ¼ 0:0050) for sector X
and Y, respectively, in the small country of the open economy, r ¼ 0:43 (p ¼ 0:0019) for
sector X in the large country of the open economy, and r ¼ 0:39 (p ¼ 0:0310) for sector Y
in the closed economy. In the remaining two cases—sector Y in the large country of the
open economy and sector X of the closed economy—there is also a positive (albeit
statistically insigniﬁcant) correlation between the wage tax rate and output price
uncertainty.
In our view Observations 3 and 4 together strongly suggest that price uncertainty
triggered by the wage tax is indeed an important explanatory factor for the reluctance of
producers to employ labor and capital.
Although further empirical as well as theoretical research is needed to establish the
precise power of the offered explanation, it points at an important and under-exposed
determinant of unemployment. Moreover, it has an important bearing on the debate
concerning the pernicious character of wage taxation (and, more generally, the taxation of
inputs). If producers are reluctant to buy inputs due to uncertainty about output prices,
having to pay taxes up-front seems to exacerbate the negative effects on employment. Note
that loss aversion, as in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), would make this
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few empirical studies exist, typically showing a negative effect (of inﬂation, for instance; see Aizenman and
Marion, 1993; Brunetti and Weder, 1998).
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production or sales—which effectively makes the government share the risk faced by the
producer—would be an alternative worth investigating.
4. Concluding discussion
For the closed as well as the small and the large country of the international economy,
we have found evidence for negative economic effects of wage taxation as a means of
ﬁnancing unemployment beneﬁts. Our results provide empirical support for a vicious circle
in the dynamic interaction between the wage tax and the unemployment rate.
Furthermore, it turned out that employment is boosted by allowing a deﬁcit in the budget
of the tax–beneﬁt system. Keeping the tax rate constant at the level predicted by the
competitive equilibrium model, convergence towards the competitive equilibrium is
observed for many variables. However, this development is accompanied by economically
signiﬁcant budget deﬁcits. Once the wage tax is forced to adjust in the direction of a budget
balance the employment level, as well as real GDP and other indicators of economic
performance, gradually tend to stabilize at a level that substantially falls short of the
equilibrium prediction.
An important observation in this context is that there appears to be downward pressure
on the employment of production factors, which is not accounted for in existing general
equilibrium models. The uncertainty risk or ambiguity averse producers are facing when
buying inputs before precisely knowing what they will make for their outputs can explain
this phenomenon. Because of the uncertainty producers restrict the purchase of inputs,
which restricts outputs. Consequently, there is a tendency for input prices to be lower, and
for output prices to be higher than the equilibrium predictions. It is consistent with this so-
called risk-compensated price mechanism that a wage tax exacerbates these effects.
Our ﬁndings suggest that policymakers relying on the outcomes of (theoretical) models
neglecting this mechanism would underestimate the negative effects of wage taxation.
According to the European Commission (1994), plans for an alternative, employment
friendlier ﬁscal structure deserve greater attention and serious study. Our study suggests
that shifting taxation from labor, and more generally any kind of inputs, to outputs is
worthwhile to be investigated. Another interesting issue for future research would be to
investigate the effects of adjusting the unemployment beneﬁt instead of the wage tax to
balance the budget (cf. Rochetau, 1999).
From a theoretical perspective, the contribution of our experimental study is twofold.
Firstly, it suggests that a better understanding of the determinants of unemployment can
be obtained by allowing for output price uncertainty and risk or ambiguity aversion in
economic models. In this respect, this paper provides support for some existing partial
equilibrium models bearing this out. By neglecting these issues, present general equilibrium
models seem to foster a too rosy view of the economic effects of wage taxation. Secondly,
and more generally, the results of our experiment suggest a new perspective on the micro
foundation of macroeconomics. In simple market experiments it was already shown that
behavioral aspects should not be disregarded (see e.g. Myagkov and Plott, 1997 on loss
aversion, Ball et al., 2001 on status). Our experiment adds that behavioral factors can also
be relevant for the outcome in more complex market environments. This indicates that the
signiﬁcance of other features (like norms, cognitive limitations, emotions, and bounded
rationality) in complex settings can be fruitfully investigated with the help of laboratory
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A. Riedl, F. van Winden / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 871–900 893experimentation. Further empirical regularities found by these experiments can generate
new theoretical research questions and lead to new and better micro- and macro-economic
general equilibrium models.
From a broader methodological point of view, the technology developed for running
macro-economic experiments opens up the possibility to study many other important
issues in the lab, like public debt or the impact of labor market institutions, for example. In
light of the ﬁndings obtained so far, macro-economic experiments seem to offer an
interesting and challenging research tool which complements the more traditional
theoretical and ﬁeld empirical analysis.
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Appendix A. Results of convergence analysis
Table A1 summarizes the results of our convergence analysis described in Result 2 and
some further observations and results thereafter for the real variables, the relative prices,
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Table A1
Convergence results for constant tax periods
Variable B11 B12 B13 B14 B2 Prediction p-Value Wald’s w2
Closed economy
X 180.6 121.4 142.0 144.5 163.1 177 0.001 27681.6
(8.24) (16.74) (3.54) (13.73) (4.41)
Y 154.8 120.5 103.1 158.5 138.9 151 0.000 11865.4
(4.33) (8.14) (6.36) (14.73) (3.05)
K 219.1 221.8 196.6 185.9 216.1 240 0.000 34287.2
(8.95) (8.08) (3.75) (9.04) (2.43)
L 252.2 208.5 189.6 233.2 214.6 226 0.011 10241.6
(9.74) (19.78) (5.09) (16.65) (4.50)
r 0.0800 0.0539 0.0581 0.0933 0.0588 0.0504 0.058 784.7
(0.0044) (0.0182) (0.0069) (0.0118) (0.0044)
w 0.2449 0.2632 0.2273 0.2094 0.2609 0.2978 0.000 10289.6
(0.0057) (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.0080) (0.0041)
A. Riedl, F. van Winden / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 871–900 894and the relative surpluses. The variables are described at the bottom of the table. The
reported p-value results from a two-sided F-test comparing B2 with the predicted value
‘Prediction’.
Table A2 reports ‘system efﬁciency’, deﬁned as the total earnings of consumers
as a percentage of the theoretically predicted earnings, for all sessions and all periods




Variable B11 B12 B13 B14 B2 Prediction p-Value Wald’s w2
px 0.2911 0.3512 0.3292 0.3190 0.3370 0.3088 0.000 135054.6
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0065) (0.0017)
py 0.3670 0.3790 0.3785 0.6288 0.3444 0.3628 0.000 32611.1
(0.0086) (0.0182) (0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0044)
s 0.0147  0.0827  0.0981  0.0193  0.0657 0 0.000 271.7
(0.0224) (0.0422) (0.0124) (0.0329) (0.0099)
International economy
X 171.9 129.0 183.6 164.7 177 0.000 5561.2
(5.97) (8.22) (14.59) (3.43)
Yh 15.4 14.1 18.9 14.8 19 0.000 1135.4
(2.82) (2.98) (1.72) (0.87)
Yf 89.9 137.1 113.7 120.3 132 0.000 11468.0
(12.22) (10.97) (3.38) (2.43)
K 231.5 209.2 230.7 236.1 240 0.204 18131.7
(8.92) (5.99) (4.32) (3.04)
Lh 28.2 24.9 31.8 25.5 28 0.084 811.7
(2.48) (3.51) (4.58) (1.43)
Lf 167.0 175.5 204.6 186.2 197 0.041 2700.0
(12.13) (11.26) (14.19) (5.27)
r 0.0141 0.0164 0.0201 0.0169 0.0307 0.000 375.4
(0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0013)
wh 0.1903 0.2010 0.1748 0.1825 0.1694 0.001 4962.4
(0.0110) (0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0039)
wf 0.1796 0.1426 0.1547 0.1501 0.1694 0.000 5419.4
(0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0029)
px 0.1764 0.2283 0.1869 0.2001 0.1882 0.038 5628.6
(0.0144) (0.0039) (0.0082) (0.0057)
pyh 0.2277 0.2177 0.2500 0.2390 0.2211 0.009 2016.5
(0.0171) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0068)
pyf 0.2107 0.2059 0.2446 0.2211 0.2211 0.985 30222.6
(0.0181) (0.0102) (0.0037) (0.0024)
sh  0.0927  0.0895  0.0070  0.1409 0 0.000 29.6
(0.0676) (0.0804) (0.1129) (0.0345)
sf  0.2724  0.1578  0.0425  0.1174 0 0.000 887.3
(0.0467) (0.0154) (0.0539) (0.0108)
Note: X, Y, Yh, Yf denote sales in sectors X and Y; K denotes employed capital; L, Lh, Lf are employed units of
labor; r is the relative price of capital, w, wh, wl are the relative wages; px is the relative price of X; py, pyh, pyf are
the relative prices of Y; s, sh, sf are budget surpluses relative to gross national income; the subscripts h and f in the
international economy denote the home and the foreign country, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses,
corrected for session speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and AR(1).















System efﬁciency: Sum of consumers welfare relative to theoretical prediction (in percent)
Period Closed economy International economy
CE01 CE02 CE03 CE04 OE01 OE02 OE03
Home Foreign Total Home Foreign Total Home Foreign Total
1 97.0 92.2 90.0 94.7 61.3 93.6 83.0 94.5 95.2 95.0 97.7 98.7 98.4
2 98.4 88.0 91.8 92.6 106.3 91.2 96.1 96.4 96.9 96.7 101.0 96.6 98.0
3 99.0 92.0 92.4 97.1 89.8 95.7 93.8 61.9 95.1 84.3 97.6 98.0 97.9
4 99.4 92.4 95.1 99.2 88.7 95.1 93.0 96.9 96.9 96.9 93.8 98.9 97.2
5 97.6 92.5 94.9 97.7 98.8 93.9 95.5 93.8 97.5 96.3 101.3 99.0 99.8
6 96.7 91.2 95.3 99.6 95.5 96.0 95.8 95.2 97.5 96.8 92.9 98.9 96.9
7 96.7 91.9 93.6 95.2 98.9 93.5 95.3 61.6 98.3 86.3 94.9 98.7 97.4
8 96.8 92.8 95.4 92.8 94.2 96.8 96.0 95.8 96.9 96.5 100.2 98.6 99.1
9 94.5 91.3 95.7 93.5 82.2 91.3 88.3 83.9 95.1 91.4 65.5 98.6 87.8
10 80.2 92.4 94.9 88.3 78.2 90.6 86.6 86.2 94.5 91.8 92.9 98.2 96.5
11 96.6 88.9 95.3 93.3 83.0 94.0 90.4 89.2 90.0 89.7 98.2 98.9 98.7
12 95.6 89.5 94.4 92.0 82.4 93.7 90.0 77.4 87.9 84.4 101.4 98.7 99.6
13 96.6 94.1 93.3 77.6 93.8 88.5 87.6 94.0 91.9 101.3 98.3 99.3
14 97.3 92.1 84.3 94.8 91.3 87.9 93.0 91.4 97.4 98.6 98.2
15 88.9 94.9 93.0 93.0 93.8 93.6 97.7 98.4 98.1
16 83.8 95.0 91.4 70.6 89.5 83.3 96.7 97.3 97.1
Averages across:
Constant tax periods 97.8 91.4 93.4 96.6 91.7 94.5 93.6 87.0 96.8 93.6 97.4 98.4 98.1
Variable tax periods 93.9 91.0 95.0 92.2 82.5 93.5 89.9 84.5 92.2 89.7 93.9 98.4 96.9




























































6Appendix B. Redemption values and production schedules
This appendix contains examples of tables showing the redemption values of consumers
in the (large) foreign country and the production schedule of an X-producer in the (small)
home country of the international economy. The redemption values for consumers in the
home country of the international economy and the closed economy and for the other
producer types are similar. (Note, that for publishing technical reasons the schedules
reproduced here to not exactly resemble the original versions used in the experiment.) The
complete set of instructions including all tables is available upon request from the authors.
B.1. Redemption value table of a consumer in the foreign country of the international
economy
A production schedule for Type-I (consumer) X is given in Table B1.
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Table B1
Redemption values table Type-I
Unit V unit V total X unit X total Y unit Y total
value value value value value value
N.B. The redemption value is 0 if you have not got at least 1 unit of all the goods (V, X and Y).
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 4.33 4.33 17.33 17.33 17.33 17.33
3 2.53 6.87 10.14 27.47 10.14 27.47
4 1.80 8.66 7.19 34.66 7.19 34.66
5 1.39 10.06 5.58 40.24 5.58 40.24
6 1.14 11.20 4.56 44.79 4.56 44.79
7 0.96 12.16 3.85 48.65 3.85 48.65
8 0.83 13.00 3.34 51.99 3.34 51.99
9 0.74 13.73 2.94 54.93 2.94 54.93
10 0.66 14.39 2.63 57.56 2.63 57.56
11 0.60 14.99 2.38 59.95 2.38 59.95
12 0.54 15.53 2.18 62.12 2.18 62.12
13 0.50 16.03 2.00 64.12 2.00 64.12
14 0.46 16.49 1.85 65.98 1.85 65.98
15 0.43 16.93 1.72 67.70 1.72 67.70
16 0.40 17.33 1.61 69.31 1.61 69.31
17 0.38 17.71 1.52 70.83 1.52 70.83
18 0.36 18.06 1.43 72.26 1.43 72.26
19 0.34 18.40 1.35 73.61 1.35 73.61
20 0.32 18.72 1.28 74.89 1.28 74.89
21 0.30 19.03 1.22 76.11 1.22 76.11
22 0.29 19.32 1.16 77.28 1.16 77.28
23 0.28 19.60 1.11 78.39 1.11 78.39
24 0.27 19.86 1.06 79.45 1.06 79.45
25 0.26 20.12 1.02 80.47 1.02 80.47
26 0.25 20.36 0.98 81.45 0.98 81.45
27 0.24 20.60 0.94 82.40 0.94 82.40
28 0.23 20.83 0.91 83.31 0.91 83.31
29 0.22 21.05 0.88 84.18 0.88 84.18
30 0.21 21.26 0.85 85.03 0.85 85.03
31 0.20 21.46 0.82 85.85 0.82 85.85
32 0.20 21.66 0.79 86.64 0.79 86.64
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A production schedule for Type-II X (X-producer) is given in Table B2.
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Table B2
Production table Type-II X
Units W Units V
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000 .
1 0 2 3 3 3 3 33333333333333 .
2 0 2 3 4 5 5 55555666666666 .
3 0 2 4 5 6 6 77778888888888 .
4 0 2 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 .
5 0 2 4 5 7 8 9 91 01 01 11 11 11 11 21 21 21 21 21 2.
6 0 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 .
7 0 2 4 6 7 8 1 01 11 11 21 31 31 41 41 51 51 51 51 61 6.
8 0 2 4 6 7 9 1 01 11 21 31 31 41 51 51 61 61 61 71 71 7.
9 0 2 4 6 7 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 51 61 71 71 71 81 81 9.
10 0 2 4 6 7 9 10 11 13 14 15 15 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 .
11 0 2 4 6 7 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 18 19 19 20 20 21 .
12 0 2 4 6 7 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 .
13 0 2 4 6 7 9 10 12 13 14 15 17 17 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 .
14 0 2 4 6 7 9 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 23 .
15 0 2 4 6 7 9 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 .
16 0 2 4 6 7 9 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 24 .
17 0 2 4 6 7 9 11 12 14 15 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 .
18 0 2 4 6 7 9 11 12 14 15 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 .
19 0 2 4 6 8 9 11 12 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 .
2 0 . . . . . . .............. .
Table B1 (continued)
Unit V unit V total X unit X total Y unit Y total
value value value value value value
33 0.19 21.85 0.77 87.41 0.77 87.41
34 0.19 22.04 0.75 88.16 0.75 88.16
35 0.18 22.22 0.72 88.88 0.72 88.88
36 0.18 22.40 0.70 89.59 0.70 89.59
37 0.17 22.57 0.68 90.27 0.68 90.27
38 0.17 22.73 0.67 90.94 0.67 90.94
39 0.16 22.90 0.65 91.59 0.65 91.59
40 0.16 23.06 0.63 92.22 0.63 92.22
41 0.15 23.21 0.62 92.84 0.62 92.84
42 0.15 23.36 0.60 93.44 0.60 93.44
43 0.15 23.51 0.59 94.03 0.59 94.03
44 0.14 23.65 0.57 94.60 0.57 94.60
45 0.14 23.79 0.56 95.17 0.56 95.17
46 0.14 23.93 0.55 95.72 0.55 95.72
47 0.13 24.06 0.54 96.25 0.54 96.25
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